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We provide a general investigation of logic in which the notion of a simple conse- 
quence relation is taken to be fundamental. Our notion is more general than the 
usual one since we give up monotonicity and use multisets rather than sets. We use 
our notion to characterize several known logics (including linear logic and non- 
monotonic logics) and for a general, semantics-independent classification of 
standard onnectives via equations on consequence relations (these include Girard’s 
“multiplicatives” and “additives”). We next investigate the standard methods for 
uniformly representing consequence relations: Hilbert type, Natural Deduction, and 
Gentzen type. The advantages and disadvantages of using each system and what 
should be taken as good representations in each case (especially from the 
implementation point of view) are explained. We end by briefly outlining (with 
examples) some methods for developing non-uniform, but still efficient, representa- 
tions of consequence relations. 8“ 1991 Academic Press. Inc. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper has two main purposes. From a very general perspective it 
aims to help clarify basic questions concerning logics. For example: 
l What is a logic? 
l What is a formal inference system? 
l What are the differences between the usual kinds of formal systems 
and what is common to them? 
l Are these kinds of systems the only possible useful ones? 
l What is so special about the usual standard connectives? 
The second purpose, intimately connected with the first, is to suggest new 
methods for representing logics, that might make search for proofs, proof 
checking, and implementation easier. 
The practical importance of the above goals is immediately realized 
when one is trying to design a general framework for implementing logical 
systems on a computer. This exactly is the aim of the Edinburgh LF system 
* A preliminary version of this paper appeared as research report ECS-LFCS-87-X) of 
LFCS. Department of Computer Science, University of Edinburgh. 
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(see Harper, Honsell, and Plotkin, 1987; Avron, Honsell, and Mason, 
1987), which is currently under development at the Laboratory for Foun- 
dations of Computer Science of the University of Edinburgh. The present 
paper is the result of an attempt to solve basic problems which were 
encountered while working on the LF project. Its new ideas and methods 
have proved to be rather helpful for developing this specific system. We 
hope, however, that they will be of help for any other effort at the same 
direction that might be made in the future. Our point of view below is, 
accordingly, a practical one. We do not claim, therefore, to solve here the 
deep problems that exist concerning the foundations of logic. Still, the 
content of this paper is certainly relevant to these problems as well. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: 
In Section 2 we explain our notion of a simple consequence relation 
(which is more general than the usual one) and why we take it to be the 
fundamental concept of logic. 
In Section 3 we provide examples of consequence relations with various 
properties. 
In Section 4 we investigate two natural groups of connectives that can be 
classified via equations on consequence relations. We then proceed to 
characterize several propositional calculi (including classical, intuitionistic, 
linear, and relevant) in terms of these general connectives. 
Between the abstract consequence relations which are discussed in 
Sections 2-4 and their actual implementations on a computer there is a 
necessary intermediate level. This is the level of formal systems (or, in Gab- 
bay’s terminology, algorithmic proof systems). Section 5 provides the main 
general theoretical background concerning formal systems which is needed 
(so we believe) for the task of efficiently implementing current logical 
systems. We discuss in it the standard methods for uniformly representing 
consequence relations: Hilbert type systems, Natural Deduction, and 
Gentzen type systems. We define all three in precise terms. According to 
our definitions Hilbert systems are a special case of Natural Deduction 
systems. The latter are, in turn, a special kind of Gentzen-type systems. The 
advantages and disadvantages of using each system and what should be 
taken as a good representation in each case are explained. The notion of a 
pure system is found to be crucial in this context, especially from the 
implementation point of view. Various ways in which systems may fail to 
be pure are described, with examples, at the end of this section. 
In Section 6 we briefly outline (with examples) some methods for 
developing non-uniform, but still efficient, representations of consequence 
relations in the case where good uniform representations are not available. 
Because of the general nature of the ideas discussed below it is very 
difficult to trace the origin of each of them or to give credit. Nevertheless, 
I would like to mention at least the name of Tarski, the papers of Scott 
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[1974a, b] (in which the notion of a consequence relation of the type dealt 
with here and many other important ideas were first introduced), Hacking 
[1979], Belnap 119821, and above all-Gentzen [1969]. Exactly like 
Hacking [1979], I see my paper just as a collection of footnotes to this 
brilliant work of Gentzen.+ 
2. THE NOTION OF A CONSEQUENCE RELATION 
2.1. Axiomatic Systems 
Traditionally a “formal system” is understood to include the following 
components: 
1. A formal language L with several syntactic categories, one of which 
is the category of “well formed formulae” (wff). 
2. An effective set of wffs called “axioms”. 
3. An effective set of rules (called “inference rules”) for deriving 
theorems from the axioms. 
The set of “theorems” is usually taken to be the minimal set of wffs which 
includes all the axioms and is closed under the rules of inference. 
Systems of this sort have many names in the literature. Here we shall call 
them axiomatic systems (or, sometimes, Hilbert systems for theoremhood). 
Undoubtly they constitute the most basic kind of formal systems. One can 
argue that in fact all other, more complicated deduction formalisms reduce 
to systems of this sort. This is true, though, for every recursively-defined 
system. Take for example the wff’s in the propositional calculus. One can 
regard them as the “theorems” of the axiomatic system in which the “wff’s” 
are strings of symbols, the “axioms” are the propositional variables, and 
the “inference rules” are the usual formation rules.’ The concept of 
theoremhood in systems of the above sort is not sufficient, therefore, to 
characterize the notion of a logic. It is too broad a concept. On the other 
hand the notion of theoremhood of wff’s is, at all same time, also too 
narrow to characterize what a logical system concerning these wff’s is ah 
about. 
Let us make our last point clearer with two very simple examples from 
+Since this paper was printed I came to know several works of K. DoSen (including his 
Thesis) which have a lot in common with the present work. Gabbay’s research on algorithmic 
proof theory is also very relevant. 
’ In some recent systems of typed constructive mathematics (see, e.g., [Martin-LBf, 19841) 
this resemblance is taken rather seriously and both “proposition” and “theorem” are taken as 
(different) ‘tjudgments” so that there is no significant difference between possible proofs of 
these ‘Ijudgments”! 
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the domain of 3-valued logic.’ Consider Kleene’s 3- valued logic. It has 3 
“truth-values,” 1, 0, and - 1, of which 1 is taken as the only designated 
one. The operations corresponding to the usual connectives are 1 a = -a, 
a v b = max(a, b), a A b = min(a, b). Suppose that L is the language of 
propositional calculus where the wff’s are defined as usual. It is immediate 
then that 120 wff is a theorem of this logic (i.e., there is no wff that gets a 
designated value under all assignments). The notion of theoremhood seems 
to be vacuous for this logic. One might ask therefore in what sense it is a 
“logic.” 
On the other hand, consider the case in which we take both 1 and 0 to 
be designated. It is easy then to see that a wff is a theorem of the new logic 
iff it is a classical tautology. From the point of view of theoremhood there 
is no difference between this logic and the classical, two-valued one. But are 
they really the same? Obviously not; a major difference is, e.g., that the 
“new” 3-valued logic is puruconsistent: It is possible for inconsistent theory 
to be non-trivial in this logic. (It is possible, e.g., for P and 1 P to be both 
“true” while Q is “false”). 
2.2. Consequence Relations 
Both examples above show that sets of “logical truths” are not enough 
to characterize logics. The second example indicates that what is really 
important is what wff’s follow from what theories. Indeed, in modern treat- 
ments of logic another concept, that of a Consequence Relation (C.R.)3 is 
taken as fundamental. Logic might be defined, in fact, as the science of con- 
sequence relations. Unfortunately, the notion of a C.R. has in the literature 
several (similar, but not identical) meanings. We shall define first the one 
which we are going to use here (which is rather general) and then discuss 
some possible reasonable variations. 
DEFINITION. A multiset Consequence Relation (C.R.) on a set C of 
formulas is a binary relation b between finite multisets of formulas s.t: 
(I) Refelexivity : A \-A for every formula A. 
(II) Transitivity, or “Cut”: if f, k d,, A and A, r2 t- A,, then 
rt, rz t A,, A,. 
’ A many-valued logic is a logic which is specified by providing (i) a set A of “truth-values” 
(like {t, f) in classical logic), (ii) a set of operations which are defined on A (and correspond 
to the primitive connectives of the language of the logic-in classical logic these operations are 
defined by the usual truth-tables), (iii) a subset Tr of A of the “designated” truth-values (in 
classical two-valued logic this is just {t } ). A sentence is logically valid in such a logic iff it gets 
a designated value under every possible assignment in A which respects the operations. 
3 See, e.g. [Scott, 1974a; Urquhart, 1984; Gabbay. 1981; Hacking, 19791. 
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2.3. Remarks and Variations 
1. We use above the notion of a “multiset.” By this we mean “sets” in 
which the number of times each element occurs is significant, but not the 
order of the elements. Thus, for example, [A, A, B] = [A, B, A] # [A, B]. 
In this example we use [ .] to denote a multiset. We shall also use “, ” for 
denoting the operation of multiset-union (so [A, A, B], [A, B] = 
[A, A, B, A, B]), and omit the “[ 1” whenever there is no danger of confu- 
sion. 
It is more customary to take a C.R. to be a relation between .vc~/s, rather 
than multisets. This is undoubtly more intuitive and so preferable whenever 
possible. There are, however, logics th full understanding of which requires 
us to make liner distinctions that only the use of multisets enables us to 
make. Examples that we consider below are Girard’s linear logic, relevance 
logics, and the finite values logics of Lukasiewicz. It is possible, of course, 
to go one step further and to take a C.R. to be between sequences of for- 
mulas (as Gentzen himself implicitly did). This, however, will considerably 
complicate the transitivity condition (II), and the need for it seems to be 
very rare indeed. 
From now on (unless otherwise stated) when we refer to a “Consequence 
Relation” without any further qualifications we shall mean a multiset C.R. 
2. In most definitions of a C.R. that one can find in the literature 
(including Scott’s original papers) there is a third condition besides the two 
formulated above. This is the weakening condition, according to which if 
f t A then also (i) 0, r k A and (ii) r t A, 0. (Sometimes only condition 
(i) is demanded, especially when one is interested only in a single-conclu- 
sioned C.R., in which r k A only if A consists of a single formula). Again, 
this is a very natural restriction. It fails however for any system for non- 
monotonic reasoning, as well as for some C.R.‘s based on linear logic and 
relevance logics. 
In the sequel, a multiset C.R. which can be taken to be between sets and 
is also closed under weakening will be called ordinary. 
3. We define a CR. to be a relation between finite (multi)sets. This 
means that we are assuming compactness for all the logics we consider. This 
rules out many “model-theretic logic? (see [Barwise and Feferman, 
19851). A partial excuse for this elimination is that we are primarily 
interested in formal systems that can be computerized, while many model- 
theoretic logics do not even have an r.e. set of valid sentences. Still, effective 
rules with infinite number of premises are possible. We believe that future 
research will allow us to cope with this possibility by an appropriate exten- 
sion of the present framework. 
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4. The above definition of a C.R. should more accurately be taken as 
a definition of a simple C.R. In [Gabbay, 19811 there is another require- 
ment: uniformity. This means that t should be “closed under substitu- 
tions.” This condition involves the inner structure of wffs. In order to make 
it precise we should take a C.R. to be a ternary relation r k, d, where r 
and A are as before and x is a finite set of variables of the language (this 
makes sense if the corresponding syntactic categories of the language 
include special subcategories of variables for these categories). For exam- 
ple, VXA h, .” 4 Y/- ) Y would intuitively means that for every formula 4 and 
any individual term t which is free for x in 4, d(t/x) follows from Vx& Such 
a general notion of a C.R. should indeed be used to get full characteriza- 
tions of logics. Using it requires, however, extending the cut condition to 
some version of resolution (i.e., unification should be incorporated), and it 
involves delicate problems concerning substitutions. We prefer therefore to 
postpone these problems to a sequel to this paper, and here to treat only 
simple C.R.‘s. 
3. SOME EXAMPLES OF ABSTRACT CONSEQUENCE RELATIONS 
3.1. First-Order Logic 
Let A i, . . . . A,, and B,, . . . . B, be formulas of some first-order language L 
(i.e., they may contain free variables). 
Truth: A 1, . . . . A, k, 4, . . . . B, iff every assignment in a first-order 
structure for L which makes all the Als true does the same to one of 
the Bjs. 
Vulidty : A,, . . . . A, k, B,, . . . . B, iff in every first-order structure (for 
L) in which all the A,‘s are valid so is at least one of the Bi’s (by “valid” 
in a structure we mean true relative to all assignments). 
The above are examples of two important C.R.s which are frequently 
associated with first order logic. It is important to note that they are not 
identical-not even in the case m = 1. Vxp(x) follows, for example, from 
p(x) according to the second, but not according to the first. On the other 
hand, the classical deduction theorem holds for the first but not for the 
second. The two consequence relations are identical, though, from the 
point of view of theoremhood: I-, A iff k, A. Moreover, if all formulas of 
r are closed then r k, A iff r t--, A. Experience in the LF project shows, 
however, that completely different attitudes are required for the implemen- 
tation of these logics on a machine (see [Avron, Honsell, and Mason, 
19871). 
The single-conclusioned fragments of both C.R.s defined above can be 
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extended to multiple-conclusioned C.R.s in more than one interesting way, 
but we shall not go into the details. 
3.2. Propositional Modal Logic 
Truth: A,, . . . . A, k, B iff given a frame and a valuation in that frame, 
B is true in every world (of the frame) in which all the Ai’s are true. 
Validity : A, , . . . . A,, k, B iff given a frame, every valuation which 
makes all the Ai’s valid (in that frame) does the same to B (by “valid” we 
mean “true in all the worlds”). 
The above are two important single-conclusioned C.R.s. The situation 
concerning them is similar to that in the previous case: A t--, q A but 
A k, CIA. The deduction theorem obtains for t--, but not for k,. Again the 
two C.R.s are identical as far as theorems are concerned.4 
3.3. Three- Valued Logic 
Assume again a propositional language with the connectives 1, v , A. 
Let corresponding operations on the truth-values { - LO, 1 } be defined as 
in Section 2.1. We define now 5 different (multiset-) C.R.s based on the 
resulting structure. In these definitions v denotes an assignment of truth 
values to formulas which respects the operations, r= A,, . . . . A, and 
A = B, , . . . . B, . 
Kl: r tKl A iff for all v, v(B,) = 1 for some i or v(Ai) E { - 1, 0} for 
some j. 
Pat: f kpPac d iff for all U, either u(B,) E { 1,O } for some i or 
u(A,) = - 1 for some j. 
Lt: r kLt A iff for all U, either u(B,) = 1 for some i, or v(A,;) = - 1 for 
some j, or u(Bi) = u(A.~) = 0 for some i, j. 
Sob: r/-sob A iff for all v, either v(B,) = 1 for some i or v(Aj) = - 1 
for some j or v(A;) = v(B,) = 0 for all i, j. 
Luk: rbLLuk A iff for all u, either u(Bi) = 1 for some i or u(A,) = - 1 
for some j or at least two formulas in r, A get 0 (under u). 
Notes. 1. The first three of these C.R.s are ordinary. The last two are 
not (see below). 
2. kk, corresponds to taking 1 as the only designated value, and so 
it is the obvious C.R. defined by the 3-valued logic of Kleene’s (given above 
as an example of a logic with no logical theorems). It was originally 
introduced by Kleene for the study of recursive functions, and today it is 
4 The distinction between the two C.R.s was crucial for the efficient implementation of both 
in the LF. See [Avron, Mansell, and Mason, 19871 for further details (some hints are 
included in Section 6 below). 
643’92’1.8 
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extensively used, e.g., in the VDM project (see [Barringer, Cheng, and 
Jones, 19841 or [Jones, 19861). The standard interpretation of 0 in it is 
“undefined.” 
3. tFkc corresponds to taking both 1 and 0 as designated. As noted 
above, it has the same set of theorems as classical propositional calculus, 
but it is paraconsistent (P, 1 P pPac Q). Moreover it is a maximal paracon- 
sistent ordinary C.R. in its language (see [Avron, 19861). As such it might 
prove to be important for future use of inconsistent knowledge bases. 
4. A 1, . . . . A, l-u B,, . . . . B, iff for every v, v(A I A A2 A . . . A A,) < 
v(B, v B, v ... v B,). This C.R. also has no theorems. In fact, if r kLt d 
then both r and d are non-empty. 
5. AI, . . . . A, tSob B iff A, +(A,+ ... +(A,-+ B)...) is valid when 
+ is defined as in Sobocinski 3-valued logic.’ Moreover, A,, . . . . A, ksSob 
B 1, . . . . B, iff t--RMj A, -+ (A2 --) ... -+ (A, + (B, + ... + B,))...), where 
A + B =def 1 A + B and RM, is the strongest in the family of logics created 
by the Relevantists school.6 This C.R. is not monotonic: weakening fails for 
it on both sides (this is our first example of this sort!). It is maximally 
paraconsistent as well. 
6. A1,...,A,kLukB iff Al+(AZ+ ... -(A,+B)...) is valid in 
Lukasiewicz three-valued logic7 (using negation, it is easy to give a corre- 
sponding interpretation for every sequant). Its main property is that 
contraction fails for it (on both sides). It is therefore completely necessary 
to understand it as a multiset C.R. 
It is interesting to note that Lukasiewicz’ 3-valued logic is equivalent, in 
a certain sense, to the full 3-valued logic used in the VDM project 
(including the non-monotonic operator d-see [Barringer, Cheng, and 
Jones, 19841 or [Jones, 19861). See [Avron, to appear, a] for more details. 
7. The classical C.R. (our first example) can also be characterized in 
the present framework by r k A iff for every v either v(AJ = - 1 or 
v(B,) = 1 or at least one formula in Z-u A gets 0 (the proof of this claim 
uses known proof-theoretical reductions). Note that this C.R. is not the 
union of kK, and br,Pac. Take, for example, r= {C v 1 P, P v R }, A = 
(C, S, R A is}. Classically r t A, but this is not the case if we interpret 
k as either t--Pat or F k1 ! 
’ This logic was introduced in [Sobocinski, 19521. It has 0 and 1 as designated and a -+ b 
is defined in it as max(b, -a) in case a <b, min(b, -a) otherwise (see also [Anderson and 
Belnap, 1975, pp. 148-1493). 
61t is obtained from Sobocinski’s logic by adding to it the connectives r\. v as defined 
above. See [Anderson and Belnap, 19751 or [Dunn, 19843 for more details. 
’ In this logic 1 is the only designated value, while a + b is defined as 1 in case a < b and 
b otherwise. 
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All the consequence relations described above were defined in abstract 
terms, using semantics. It is possible, of course, to define a C.R. directly in 
syntactical terms. Historically, for example, the two kinds of modal C.R. 
described above were (implicitly) in use long before their semantic descrip- 
tion was known! 
4. CLASSIFICATION OF C.R. ACCORDING 
TO THEIR BASIC CONNECTIVES 
This section has two related objects. The first is to classify certain impor- 
tant connectives via equations on the consequence relations in which they 
are used. The second is to provide a syntactic characterization of some 
propositional (multiset-) C.R.s in terms of the connectives which are 
definable in them.’ We examine for these purposes two classes of connec- 
tives that are common to many logics and see what general rules they 
should obey. The rules we find are quite familiar, but the fact that they are 
common to many different logics is quite significant for the task of 
constructing general systems for implementing logics.g 
4.1. Internal Connectives’o 
Given C.R., an internal connective relative to it is one that makes it 
possible to transform a given sequent to an equialent one that has a special 
required form. By “equivalent” here we mean that one sequent obtains iff 
the other does (but in most important cases it can be interpreted in a much 
stronger sense). 
In what follows assume k to be a fixed C.R. All notions defined are 
taken to be relative to k. 
Internal Disjunction : We call a binary connective + an internal 
disjunction if for all r, A, A, B, 
I-F A, A, B iff r k A, A + B. 
Internal Conjunction: We call a binary connective 0 an internal 
conjunction if for all r, A, A, B, 
r,A,BtA iff r,AoB/-A. 
’ By a “definable” connective we mean either a primitive connective of the language or one 
that can be defined as a combination of the primitive connectives using schematic variables 
(see for example the above definition in relevance logic of A + B as 1 A -+ B). 
9 This potential application has not yet been implemented in the LF, but it is soon going 
to be. 
lo The connectives which we describe in this subsection are closely related to what Girard 
[I987 J has called “multiplicatives” and to the “intensional” connectives of relevance logics. 
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Internal Negation: We call a unary connective 1 a right internal 
negation if for all r, d, A, 
T,At--d iff rj- A, 1A. 
We call a unary connective 1 a left internal negation if for all r, A, A, 
rtA,A iff r,lAkA. 
Since it can be shown (see the proposition in the next subsection) that 1 
is a right internal negation iff it is a left one, we use the term internal 
negation to mean either. It is important to note that such a negation is 
necessarily involutive (i.e., A t 11 A and 11 A t- A). 
Internal Implications: We call a binary connective + an internal 
implication if for all r, A, B, 
We call -+ a strong internal implication if for all r, A, A, B 
r,A I--d,B iff r/-A,A-+B. 
Note. We believe that the notion of an implication is intuitively best 
understood for single-conclusioned sequents (as reflected in deduction 
theorems). We have defined internal implication accordingly. Strong 
implication is a natural generalization in the context of multiple-conclu- 
sioned C.R.s.” Note, however, that in the presence of an internal negation 
an internal implication is necessarily a strong one! 
Internal Truth: We call a 0-ary connective T an internal truth if for all 
c A, 
rt-d iff T, rtA 
Internal Falsehood: We call a 0-ary connective I an internal false- 
hood if for all r, A, 
rt-d iff rtA,L 
PROPOSITION. The following are immediate consequences of the above 
definitions: 
1. Zf t has a (primitive or definable) internal disjunction (conjunction) 
then any sequent r k A such that A(T) is not empty is equivalent to a 
sequent of the form r t- A(A k A). Zf t has also an internal falsehood 
(truth) then this is true for any sequent. 
I1 The term “strong” reflects the fact that the corresponding condition is strictly stronger 
than the one we have taken as primary. See below. 
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2. Zf k has internal disjunction, implication and falsehood then for all 
Z, A there is A such that Z /- A is equivalent to t-A. Problems concerning 
such consequence relations can therefore be reduced to problems about 
theoremhood of formulas. 
3. Zf t has a right (left) internal negation then any sequent is equivalent 
to one in which the left (right) hand side is empty. If in addition it has also 
an internal disjunction (conjunction) then every non-empty sequent is equiv- 
alent to one of the form tA(At). 
4. Zf k has a strong implication then every sequent in which the right- 
hand side is not empty is equivalent to one with the left-hand side empty. 
4.2. Characterizing the Internal Connectives by Gentzen Type Rules 
In the previous subsection we have introduced several internal connec- 
tives. Their definitions can be split into two rules that are the converse of 
each other. In each case one of the two rules does not have what Gentzen 
has called “the subformula property.“” In this subsection we describe a 
uniform method for deriving rules with the subformula property which 
characterize the same connectives. All the rules we shall find are quite 
standard in Gentzen-type systems. As an example, we treat the case of 
strong implication in detail. We then list the rules which are obtained by 
the same method for the other connectives. 
The definition above directly entails that --f is a strong implication iff t 
is closed under the rules 
r, A t B, A Z-kA-+B,A 
TtA+B,A r, A t B, A ’ 
The first of these rules already has the subformula property. The second 
does not. In order to find an appropriate substitute for it we use the 
reflexivity and transitivity of t. The reflexivity condition, applied to a 
formula with -+ as the principal connective, yields 
A-+BkA-+B. 
Hence the second condition above implies that 
A,A-+Bt-BB. 
Taking A -+ B to be the principal formula in the last sequent, we proceed 
next to eliminate the others using cuts. Suppose, accordingly, that 
I2 A rule in a calculus of sequents has the subformula property if any formula that occurs 
in one of its premises is a subformula of some formula that occurs in the conclusion of the 
rule. 
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rI k A,, A and B, r, t-- A,. Then two cuts of these two sequents with the 
last sequent above result with rI, r2, A + B t- A r, A*. We obtain, there- 
fore, that in order for -+ to be a strong implication relative to k this 
relation should be closed under the rule 
Conversely, the closure of k under this rule implies the provability of the 
sequent A, A -+ B t- B, and so if r t- A -+ B, A then also r, A 1 B, A 
(using a cut). This proves the first part of the propositon below. 
PROPOSITION. 1. + is a strong internal implication tff b is closed under 
the rules 
r, A t B, A w4,~ 4r2tA2 
TtA+B,A LLA+BbL&’ 
Similarly we can show 
2. + is an internal disjunction tjf t is closed under the rules 
rt A, 4 A A, rl t A, 4 rz t A, 
TtA+B,A rl,rz,A+Bt-l,Az’ 
3. 0 is an internal conjunction iff k is closed under the rules 
rlt--d,,A rztAz,B r, A, B t- A 
rl,rzt--,,Az,AoB T’,AoBkA’ 
4. -+ is an internal implication iff /- is closed under the rules 
r,At-B wd,,A w,t-A, 
TkA+B r,,r,,A+BtA,,Az' 
5. I is an internal falsehood iff t is closed under the rules 
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7. The following conditions are equivalent: 
(4 1 is an internal negation. 
(b) -I is a right internal negation. 
(c) 7 is a left internal negation. 
(d) t is closed under the rules 
Art-A rl-A,A 
rtA,lA lA,r/- A’ 
The following observations are immediate from these characterizations. 
They are familiar facts about the connectives of classical logic. The fore- 
going discussion and the examples at the end of this section show, however, 
that they are not peculiar to classical logic or to truth-functional connec- 
tives. 
l If t- has an internal negation I and an internal disjunction + then 
it also has an internal conjunction and a strong internal implication, 
defined by ~(1 A + 1 B) and 1 A + B respectively. Similar results obtain 
if k has an internal negation and either an internal conjunction or a strong 
internal implication. 
l If k has a strong internal implication -+ and an internal falsehood 
I then it also has an internal negation, defined by A -+ 1. 
l If k is closed under weakenings and has theorems (i.e., formulas A 
such that /---A), then each of these theorems is an internal truth. (For 
having theorems it suffices, e.g., that k has an internal implication, since 
then A -+ A is a theorem for every A.) If such t- has also an internal 
negation then the negation of each theorem is an internal falsehood. 
4.3. The Combining Connectives 
Among the rules that we have found for the internal connectives there 
are rules that take two sequents and return a single one. In all of these 
rules, however, the resulting combination is not reversible: the premises 
cannot always be recovered from the conclusion. Indeed, one cannot expect 
to be able to combine any two sequents into one which contains exactly the 
same information as included in the original two. It is possible, though, in 
one important case: When the two sequents to be combined are identical 
in all formulas except (perhaps) one. The two sequents can then be com- 
bined through their exceptional formulas by using a new type of connec- 
tives which we shall call combining connectives.’ According to the three 
possible positions that the exceptional formulas might occupy we get the 
following principal three: 
I3 They are usually called “extensional” by the relevant&, while Girard [ 19873 calls them 
“additive.” 
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Combining Conjunction: We call a connective A a combining con- 
junction iff for all r, A, A, B, 
TkA,AAB iff rtd,A and rtA,B. 
Combining Disjunction: We call a connective v a combining disjunc- 
tion iff for all r, A, A, B, 
AvB,TkA iff A, r /- A and B, r t A. 
Combining Implication : We call a connective 2 a combining implica- 
tion iff for all r, A, A, B, 
AIB,Z-k-d iff rt-A,A and B,r/-A. 
Notes. 1. The choice of these three connectives was guided by tradition. 
Obviously, there are other possibilities. Thus we could characterize the 
“Sheffer stroke” by 
r,AIBkA iff rt A, A and rk A, B. 
It is not difficult to carry the analysis below to this connective as well. We 
shall satisfy ourselves, though, with the above three. 
2. If an internal negation is available then the existence of one 
combining connective entails the existence of the rest. 
By using exactly the same method we have used for investigating the 
internal connectives we can show 
PROPOSITION. 1. v is a combining disjunction iff t- is closed under the 
rules 
rl-A,A rl-A,B I’,AkA T,Bt-A 
I-kA,AvBTkA,AvB T,AvBt-A ’ 
2. A is a combining conjunction iff k is closed under the rules 
r,At-A r,BkA rt--A,A rkAd,B 
J’,AABt--Ar,AABt-A TJ-A,AAB ’ 
3. 3 is a combining implication iff k is closed under the rules 
r,At-A rl--d,B rkA,A B,rt-A 
Z-t-A,AxBTt-A,AIB L’,AzBkA 
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It is easy to see that relative to an ordinary C.R. a connective is a com- 
bining disjunction (conjunction, implication) iff it is an internal disjunction 
(conjunction, strong implication). This is not the case in general, though, 
as the examples of Linear and Relevance Logics below show. 
4.4. Characterization of Some Known Logics 
As the title suggests, we shall try to use the various notions introduced 
so far for characterizing several logics (some of them are well-known, some 
others should be). We shall examine each logic according to three criteria: 
l Being regular or not, where by “regular” we shall mean below that 
the associated C.R. can be taken to be between sets. 
l Being monotonic or nonmonotonic. 
. The internal and combining connectives which are available in it. 
“Multiplicative” Linear Logic :‘4 This is the logic which corresponds 
to the minimal (multiset) C.R. which includes all the internal connectives 
discussed above. If we omit the internal truth and falsehood we get the 
minimal CR. which includes the others (the full system is conservative with 
respect to this fragment). In both versions the system is neither regular nor 
monotonic. 
Propositional Linear Logic (without the “exponentials” and the 
propositional constants T and F): This corresponds to the minimal conse- 
quence relation which contains all the connectives introduced above. 
Again, it is neither regular no monotonic. It is important to note that its 
internal connectives behave quite differently from its combining ones! 
R---the Intensional Fragment of the Relevance Logic RI’~ This 
corresponds to the minimal CR. which contains all the internal connectives 
(the interval truth and falsehood are again optional) and is closed under 
contraction. It is still neither regular nor monotonic.i6 
The purely implicational fragment of this logic was first introduced by 
Church [1951]. It is interesting to note that it is known to correspond to 
the Ucalculus (see [Barendregt, 19841) through a suitable version of the 
” See [Guard, 19871. 
I5 See [Anderson and Belnap, 19751 or [Dunn, 19841. 
I6 A word is in order here as to what C.R. associated with R, we have in mind, since there 
is more than one candidate. The answer is: that which the standard Gentzen type formulation 
of this system defines. An equialent definition is A,, . . . . A, kR, B,, . . . . B, iff 
AI-t(A2+ . ..(A.-+B,+ ... +B,)...)isatheoremofthissystem,whereA+Bis -A-B 
and (A, + B, + + B,) is -A, is case m = 0. (The axioms of the system guarantee that this 
is indeed a C.R. In particular, the order of the A,‘s and the B,‘s is not important.) The last 
interpretation is the one we have in mind also with respect to the other systems in the 
relevance/linear family. 
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Curry-Howard isomorphism. This correspondence is completely similar to 
that which exists between the implicational fragment of intuitionistic (or 
minimal) logic and the ordinary L-calculus. 
R’ without Distribution: This corresponds to the minimal C.R. which 
contains all the connectives which were described above and is closed 
under contraction. 1 and T are again optional. 
RMI, . ” This corresponds to the minimal regular C.R. which contains 
internal negation, disjunction, conjunction, and implication. 
RM; . ‘* This corresponds to the minimal regular C.R. which includes 
all internal connectives described above. 
In contrast to linear logic and R,, RM’, is not a conservative extension 
of RMZ,. This means that the addition of internal truth (or falsehood) to 
RMI, forces new sequents in the language of this system to obtain. The 
reason is that the internal constants bring with them part of the power of 
weakening. This happens to be harmless in the context of linear logic and 
R, but together with the converse of contraction, (which is available, of 
course, in every regular C.R. but can also be taken as a very special case 
of weakening) it causes sequents like A, B*A, B to be provable. This is 
true in fact for every regular C.R. which has an internal implication: 
starting with (*T, T), (A *A), and (B* B), two applications of (+a) 
yield T -+ A, T + B =S A, B. But since T, A *A is provable, so are A * 
T + A and B =S T -+ B. Hence two cuts yield A, B + A, B. (In order to get 
a cut-free representation of this system it is necessary to add the following 
“mingle” rule: from Tl*d, and r,=>A, infer f1,r2*A,, AZ.“) 
Classical Propositional Logic: This of course corresponds to the mini- 
mal ordinary C.R. which has all the above connectives. Needless to say, 
there is no difference in it beween the combining connectives and the 
corresponding internal ones. 
Intuitionistic Logic: It is a common belief that the main difference 
between classical and intuitionistic logic is that the latter is single-conclu- 
sioned while the former is essentially multiple-conclusioned. The origin of 
this belief is the way in which Gentzen has formulated his sequential 
version of intuitionistic logic. That version differs from his formalism for 
classical logic only by limiting sequents to have at most one formula in 
the succedent. Assuming for a moment that this belief is true, it is 
” See [Anderson and Belnap, 1975, pp. 148149; Avron, 19841. 
r* This is the intensional fragment of the system RM’ (see [Anderson and Belnap, 19751 or 
[Dunn, 19841). Without the propositional internal constants this is Sobocinski 3-valued logic 
(see 3.3 above), also called RMZ: in [Avron, 19841. 
I9 For a proof and for more information about this system see [Avron, 19871. Girard, by 
the way, uses in [Girard, 19871 the name “mix” for this rule. 
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straightforward to define for the single-conslusioned case the notions of a 
regular and an ordinary C.R., the combining connectives, and the internal 
conjunction, implication, truth, and falsehood (but not internal negation or 
strong implication!). It is easy then to see that 
The usual single-conclusioned C.R. associated with intuitionistic 
logic is the minimal ordinary single-conclusioned C.R. which 
has internal implication and falsehood and combining disjunc- 
tion and conjunction. 
We proceed now to offer what we believe to be a deeper analysis, in which 
we need not treat intuitionistic logic differently from the other logics we 
have considered so far. What we seek therefore is a multiple-conclusioned 
conservative extension of the above single-conclusioned C.R., which has the 
same types of basic connectives. The unique solution to this problem is 
easy to find once we recall that for ordinary C.R. a combining disjunction 
is also an internal one. Accordingly, we define 
A 1, . . . . A, kInt B,, . . . . B, iff there is a proof of B, v ... v B, 
from A 1, . . . . A,, in one of the usual formalisms for intuitionistic 
logic. 
It is easy now to see that 
I- Int is the minimal ordinary C.R. which has internal disjunc- 
tion, conjunction, falsehood, and implication.” 
It is illuminating to compare this to the following possible characterization 
of classical logic: 
The standard C.R. associated with classical logic is the minimal 
ordinary CR. which has internal disjunction, conjunction, false- 
hood, and strong implication. 
Accoridng to these two characterizations classical and intuitionistic logic 
differ mainly with respect to their implication connective, while their 
disjunctions are the same! Indeed, it is easy to show (using the cut-free 
multiple-conclusioned Gentzen-type formulations of the two systems) that 
exactly the same sequents which involve only v , A and I are valid in 
both (note that there are no theorems, i.e., sequents of the form FA, 
among these sequents!). There is however another crucial difference 
between the two logics that is somewhat hideen in these characterizations: 
Intuitionistic logic does not contain any internal negation: There is no 
sentence N(p) in the { v , A , +, I }-language (in which only the atomic 
” This characterization corresponds to Maehera’s multiple-conclusioned, cut-free Gentzen- 
type formulation of intuitionistic logic [Takeuti, 19751. 
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formula p occurs) such that p, N(p)k and k-p, N(p) are both valid (This 
is an immediate consequence of the disjunction property of k rnt : Since (-p 
is obviously not valid, the validity of t--p, N(p) would entail the validity of 
t--N(p). This and the validity of p, N(p)t entail the validity of pt-, where 
p is an atomic formula!), This fact might explain why the rules for negation 
leave something to be desired (compared to the rules for the other connec- 
tives) in the context of intuitionistic natural deduction21 and why authors 
like Prawitz and Schroeder-Heister prefer to take 1 rather than negation 
as a primitive connective of intuitionistic logic.” 
A final remark concerning implications. From results in [Avron, 19841 
it easily follows that the minimal regular C.R. containing a strong internal 
implication is strictly stronger than the one which contains just internal 
implication. In fact, there are sentences which are logically valid according 
to the first but not according to the second. It is not difficult to see, on the 
other hand, that the purely implicational fragment of linear logic can be 
characterized indifferently either as the minimal CR. which has an internal 
implication or as the minimal C.R. which has the stronger connective (a 
similar observation applies also to the corresponding fragment of R), 
4.5. A DIGRESSION: ON THE MEANINGS 
OF THE PROPOSITIONAL CONNECTIVES 
There is a long tradition, originated already in Gentzen [ 19691, about 
the introduction and elimination rules of Natural Deduction as providing 
the meanings of the propositional connectives. The famous [Prior, 19601 
has forced the followers of this tradition to be more careful about this issue. 
Hence today the emphasis is usually put on the introduction rules as those 
which define the meaning of a connective. Concerning the elimination rules 
the general principle is that one should not be able to get out of a formula 
more than the introduction rules can put into it. This principle was used, 
e.g., by Schroeder-Heister [1984] for developing an explicit method for 
deriving the (unique) elimination rule for a connective from the corre- 
sponding set of introduction rules.23 Unfortunately, this method does not 
seem to work beyond the realm of intuitionistic logic. A particularly impor- 
tant connective that seems to escape this type of characterization is the 
negation. The present paper suggests therefore an alternative method of 
21 The introduction rule for -I, e.g., is the only one in which the introduced connective 
should occur in one of the premises! 
22 See [Pravitz, 1973; Schroeder-Heister, 1.984]. 
23 For more explanations about this tradition, see [Sundholm, 19841 and the extensive 
literature cited there. 
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taking rules as defining the meaning of connectives. It had the following 
two main properties: 
l The meaning of a connective is always relative to some C.R. 
l What defines a connective is not a set of “introduction rules” but a 
single rule which is reversible. 
The reversible rule which defines a connective might introduce it in either 
the succedent or the antecedent of a sequent. In the first case it usually 
corresponds to an “introduction” rule of N.D., in the second-to an 
elimination rule. The combining disjunction, for example, is characterized 
by what is usually taken as the elimination rule for disjunction. In the 
present context there is no priority, therefore, of introduction rules over 
elimination rules. 
5. UNIFORM REPRESENTATIONS OF C.R.s 
The notion of a C.R., as defined in the first section and examplified in the 
second is an abstract one. We have seen above several ways, semantical as 
well as syntactical, of defining or characterizing C.R.s. However, in order 
to use a certain abstract C.R. in practice one needs a concrete way of 
representing it. This is usually done by using a formal system.24 There are 
two basic demands that such representations of a C.R. 1 should meet. 
These are: 
Faithfulness: If the representation can be used to show that I’ t- d 
then this is actually the case. 
Effectiveness: If someone uses the representation to show that r t A 
then his success in doing so can mechanically be checked. If we accept 
Church’s thesis then this means that the set of sequents that can be shown 
to hold by a given formal representation is an r.e. set. 
A third property that we would like an adequate representation of /- to 
have, but can in principle be achieved (by Church’s thesis) only if the 
represented C.R. is r.e. is: 
Completeness: Whenever r k A the representation can be used to 
show this. 
In an adequate formal representation of a C.R. t it should be possible 
to express every true fact of the form r k A. Obviously, the most direct 
24 In fact, Hodges [1983, p. 261 defines a formal system (or a “formal proof calculus”) to 
be “a device for proving sequents in a language L.” 
124 ARNON AVRON 
way of achieving this goal is to have in the formal language of formal sym- 
bol, “3,” so that the system can show that r t- d iff the corresponding 
formal sequent “r=> d” is derivable in it. In order to unify our treatment 
we assume the existence of such a formal symbol in all the formal systems 
we consider below. If officially it does not, then this assumption means that 
we are considering an extended language in which it does, and an extended 
formal system in which the connections between the old one and k are 
made a part of the formal machinery. For example, an explanation in the 
metalanguage of the form “Al, . . . . A, k B iff there is a proof of B from 
A 1, ..., A,,” will be translated (in the extended system) to “From a formal 
proof of B from A,, . . . . A,, infer A,, . . . . A, =z- B.” Formulas, formal sequent& 
and proofs will all be objects (usually of different types) of such an 
extended formal system. This might look a little bit complex, but it is 
absolutely necessary for a full represetation (that can, e.g., be com- 
puterized). 
5.1. Using Axiomatic Systems for Representations 
The oldest way of representing a C. R. k is by using an axiomatic system 
(see 2.1) which has the same language (i.e., the same well-formed formulas). 
Such axiomatic systems are designed, however, to prove theorems, and so 
they can only indirectly be used for representing C.R.s. There are two main 
methods for doing this: 
The Interpretation Method: One defines a correspondence between 
sequents of L and sets of wffs of L so that r t-- A iff at least one of the 
sentences of the corresponding set (or perhaps all of them) is a theorem of 
the corresponding axiomatic system. Usually, the corresponding set is just 
a singleton, and so every sequent is translated into some formula of the 
language. Such a translation is straightforward if t has the required inter- 
nal connectives. An interpretation using these connectives has the property 
that the interpretation of the formal sequent j A is just A. This should not 
always be the case, though. A famous example in this respect is Godel’s 
interpretation of classical logic within intuitionistic logic. An example in 
which the interpretation does not use just singletons may be provided by 
the intuitionistic pure implicational C.R. Here A,, . . . . A, k B,, . . . . B, iff for 
some i, A, ---f (A2 + . . . + (A, -+ Bi) . . . ) is a theorem (of intuitionistic 
logic). 
The Extension Method: Here we say that A,, . . . . A, k B iff B is a 
theorem of the axiomatic system which is obtained by adding A,, . . . . A, to 
the axioms of the given one. The resulting k is then a single-conclusioned, 
ordinary C.R. (see (2.3). This second method is the origin and the 
prototype of what are known as Hilber-type systems. The next subsection 
treats this type of systems in detail. 
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5.2. Hilbert Type Representations 
If we uses an axiomatic system AS together with the extension method 
in order to show that A i, . . . . A,, k B, then we should provide a proof of B 
in a new axiomatic system AS+ {A,, . . . . A,}. Of course, we do not really 
use an infinite number of new axiomatic systems. We just use one which is, 
each time, temporarily augmented by a finite number of axioms. In terms 
of formal sequents what we are doing is best described by the following 
single axiomatic system for sequents: 
Axioms. 1. A * A for every A. 







r, ) . ..) r, => B 
where 
is (an instance of) a rule of AS. 
The main fact to note concerning this sequential system is that all the 
“activity” is made on the right-hand side of the 3. This is, in fact, the main 
thing that is common to all the usual “Hilbert-type formalisms”. Accor- 
dingly we define: 
DEFINITION. A Hilbert-type system for consequence in the language L is 
an axiomatic system such that: 
1. The “formulas” are formal sequents of L. 
2. The axioms include A *A for all A. All the other axioms are of the 
form *ft. 
3. With the possible exception of cut and weakening, the set of 
formulas which appear on the left-hand side of a conclusion of a rule is the 
union of the sets of formulas which appear on the left-hand side of the 
premises. (We shall call this property the left-hand side property). 
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If we take axioms as rules with 0 premises then Hilbert representations can 
be characterized as those systems which have besides the basic reflexivity 
and transitivity rules only structural rules and/or rules with the left-hand side 
property. 
Our definition generalizes in three main points from the system which 
was presented above: 
l The system above was single-conclusioned. This is not necessarily 
the case in general.25 
l The above system was ordinary. In the general case we deal, 
however, with multisets. We have not demanded, though, that the multiset 
of formulas on the left-hand side of a conclusion should be the multiset 
union of the 1.h.s. of the premises. We require these multisets only to be 
identical as sets. This allows for rules like 
(which characterizes the combining conjunction and is important in the 
context of, e.g., linear and relevance logics). 
l The rules of the above system have the following property that rules 
in general might lack: whenever they allow (for some A, rl, . . . . r,) the 
inference of r* A from r1 => A,, . . . . r, s A,, then for all r; ,..., r; they 
allow to infer I-,‘, . . . . r; => A from r,’ =s. A,, . . . . r; =S A,,. We shall call rules 
with this property (and also systems which have only such rules) pure. 
They can be represented just by the schema 
AI . ..A., 
A ’ 
(In most known cases A and Ai are, of course, singletons). 
Obviously pure systems are the most frequent type of Hilbert-type 
systems that one finds in practice. Here is an example of an impure system. 
Take some normal model logic with the associated truth C.R. (see 3.2). 
A standard Hilbert-type representation will have some axioms and the 
following two general rules of inference: 
r,*A r,=>A+B 
6, r,=+-B 
25 An example in which a multiple-conclusioned Hilbert type system is used can be found 
in [Avron, to appear, b]. 
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The first one (M.P.) is pure, the other is not: we cannot add, for example, 
the formula A to the left hand side of its premise and conclusion. Hence 
this Hilbert-type system is impure (The material implication -+ of S4, say, 
is an internal strong implication relative to this C.R. It is quite common 
therefore to represent this C.R. by using the interpretation method of 
Section 5.1). 
Remark. It is a common belief that Hilbert-type systems have only to 
do with provability, not with deducibility.“j The reasons for this belief are 
partially historical: in the past logicians happened to be interested mainly 
in proving logical theorems and used for this Hilbert-systems for 
theoremhood, i.e., axiomatic systems. Another possible reason is that there 
might exist more than one reasonable way to define a C.R. which is com- 
patible with a given axiomatic system (i.e., has the same set of theorems). 
The pure one (obtained by the extension method) is always a candidate, 
but there might be others. We have seen the example of the impure Hilbert- 
type representations of the truth C.R. in normal modal logics (the pure 
extension, by the way, corresponds to the validity C.R.). We shall encoun- 
ter more below. What makes this phenomenon possible is that in a Hilbert- 
type system a proof of a sequent a,4 always consists of sequents of the 
same form. This allows for a certain degree of freedom while deciding what 
other sequents should be taken as valid! 
5.3. Natural-Deduction Representations 
The next type of formal systems that we examine is Natural Deduction. 
We start with a very general definition of this type of systems which closely 
resembles that given above for Hilbert-type formalisms: 
DEFINITION. A Natural Deduction system in the language L is an 
axiomatic system such that 
1. The formulas are formal sequents of L. 
2. A * A is an axiom for each formula A. 
3. All the other rules (including O-premises rules!) have the following 
property: the set of formulas that appear on the left hand side of their 
conclusion is a subset of the union of the left-hand side of the premises. 
If we compare this definition to that of Hilbert-type systems we see that 
the only difference is that in N.D. (Natural Deduction) systems we allow 
certain formulas of the left-hand side of a premise of a rule to be discharged 
from the left-hand side of the conclusion. 
x See, e.g., [Sundholm. 1983. pp. 134-1351. 
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The notion of a “pure” system can now be generalized to N.D. systems 
as follows: 
DEFINITION. We call a rule of a N.D. system “pure” if whenever f => A 
is derivable in it from r, *A,, . . . . r,,+ A, there exist sub-multisets 
r;, . . . . r;, A;, . . . . Al, and A’ of f,, . . . . f,,, A,, . . . . A,, and A (respectively) 
such that for every r,“, . . . . r:, A;, . . . . Al: we can infer 
from 
r;l, . . . . r; e- A’, A;‘, . . . . A; 
A N.D. system is pure if all its rules are pure. In such systems we can 
take all the inferences to be applications of rules of the form 
(where the f,‘, etc., are as in the above definition). 
Pure N.D. systems are again the most usual kind of N.D. systems. It is 
relatively easy to implement them in an economical way and to check 
proofs in them. In the Edinburgh LF, e.g., it is a simple task to internalize 
any ordinary, pure, single-conclusioned N.D. system, while impure systems 
are much more difficult to handle. An example of such an impure N.D. 
system is the Prawitz N.D. system for S4 (see [Prawitz, 19651). In this 
system one can infer r* q A from I-=> A only iff all the formulas in r 
begin with 0, and so this rule is impure.‘7 
There are important differences that should be noted between pure 
Hilbert systems and pure N.D. systems. In the process of using pure Hilbert 
systems one can (and does) write down in a proof-tree of a sequent only 
the r.h.s. of the sequents which participate in that proof. One can then quite 
easily discover at the end which sequent was actually proved, by just 
looking at the root and the leaves of the tree. One need not known for this 
what intermediate sequents were proved before the final one was derived. 
Moreover one can check each part of the proof separately without needing 
to examine what happened prior to that part. All these facts fail for N.D. 
proofs-even pure ones. Here one is forced to keep track at each stage of 
a proof of what sequent was actually derived in it. This is the case regardless 
of whether formal sequents are employed while the system is implemented 
“This example, as well as many others, is dealt with in [Avron, Honsell, and Mason, 
19871. 
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or other devices are used for this goal. Whatever the method is, the fact 
remains that N.D. systems are essentially calculi of sequents. 
Since Natural Deduction systems enable us to manipulate sequents and 
not only formulas, they provide us, within the formal machinery, an access 
to methods of proof that necessarily belong to the meta-theory in the case 
of Hilbert-type systems. An obvious example of this ability is the deduction 
theorem. For many Hilbert-type systems this is an important meta-theorem 
which is extensively used for indirectly showing that something is 
provable-without actually proving it. In natural deduction systems this 
method of proof is usually incorporated into the system as one of its rules. 
The ability to do such things is the main source of power of N.D. systems 
and their crucial advantage over Hilbert-type systems. 
At this point a natural objection may be raised against our definition of 
natural deduction systems: according to our presentation, every Hilbert- 
type system in a N.D. system, but not vice versa. This seems to render 
pointless the frequent problem of finding a Natural-Deduction presentation 
for a C.R. for which a Hilbert-type representation is already known. Some- 
thing essential seems to be missing: the notion of introduction and elimina- 
tion rules which [Sundholm, 19631, for example, takes to be the second 
major component (besides the possibility of discharging assumptions) of 
natural deduction systems. It seems quite difficult, though, to find a suf- 
ficiently general definition of this notion which will not rule our from the 
class of N.D. formalisms systems that are taken to be such in the literature. 
In fact the very first N.D. representation of classical logic in [Gentzen, 
19691 included as axiom the excluded middle, which cannot be charac- 
terized in terms of introduction and elimination rules. It really seems that 
almost only intuitionistic logic, together with a careful choice of the basic 
connectives, admits single-conclusioned N.D. representation consiting only 
of matching introduction and elimination rules (Actually, some fragments 
of linear and relevance logics admit such as well, but the corresponding 
C.R. is not ordinary). As for classical logic, the only way to do so is by 
using multiple-conclusioned N. D. systems, but this certainly is not the 
standard procedure! We conclude, therefore, that the demand for using 
matching introduction and elimination rules belongs to the methodology of 
constructing good N.D. representations, not to their definition. 
The last discussion brings us to the question what makes one formal 
representation of C.R. better then another. We suggest the following two 
criteria: 
l ease of finding (and also checking) proofs of sequents; 
l usefulness for (constructively) showing significant properties of the 
represented C.R. (An example of such a property in many logics is Craig’s 
interpolation theorem.) 
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Past experience indicates that in the context of N.D. systems the above 
two goals are best achieved by first formulating such a system using intro- 
duction and (matching) elimination rules; then using these rules for 
defining a notion of a “normal proof” with nice properties; and finally 
proving a “normalization theorem” to the effect that every proof can be 
converted into a normal proof of the same end sequent. This method seems 
to be successful especially when the connectives involved are internal28 and 
when the represented C.R. can be characterized in terms of them-as was 
the case in the examples of the last section. The exact characterization of 
the C.R.s to which this method is applicable is an interesting topic which 
we are not going to pursue here.29 
A final point to discuss is the status of the cut rule in the context of N.D. 
(including Hilbert-type) systems. It can easily be chacked that the delini- 
tion we gave above does not exclude cut from being one of their rules. For 
pure systems the possibility to eliminate it is can be shown rather easily. 
For impure systems, on the other hand, it might be less easy and should 
not be taken for granted. Here is an example of a system for which cut- 
elimination is true but not completely trivial: Consider the {l, q } 
fragment of the N.D. system for S4. It is immediate that in this system we 
have that 11 q A k q A and that CIA l- 0 OA. It is not, at first glance, 
obvious that 11 q A k 0 q A, since because of the side conditions on the 
(* 0 ) rule, the proofs of these two sequents cannot directly be combined 
to produce a proof of the third. (This is strongly related to the fact that 
normalization fails for this version of the system-see [Prawitz, 19651.) 
The system does admit cut-elimination, though, but this requires at least 
some efforts. It is not inconceivable that more complicated impure N.D. 
systems might offer more serious difficulties while proving cut-elimination, 
or even that it just may fail for them! 
5.4. Gen tzen- Type Representations 
As we argue above, already pure N.D. systems essentially carry us from 
proofs of formulas to proofs of sequents. The next obvious step is therefore 
to take full advantage of the use of sequents by allowing the rules of a 
system to make significant changes also in the antecedent of a sequent: 
” To a lesser degree-also when they arc of the combining type. The resulting N.D. system 
is usually impure, though, when these combining connectives are not also internal-as is the 
case in relevance and linear logics. 
*‘Some authors, especially those with intuitionistic tendencies. believe the method of 
introduction and elimination rules, as well as the concept of a normal proof, to be of a crucial 
philosophical importance. They believe. accordingly, that there are deeper reasons for the 
success of this method than the above description suggests. The interested reader is referred 
to the enormous literature on the subject such as [Prawitz, 1965, 19731; [Sundholm, 19841; 
[Schroeder-Heister, 19841 and (of course!) the original paper of Gentzen [1969]. Section 4.5 
above is also relevant. 
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DEFINITION. A Gentzen-type representation of a given C.R. /- in a 
language L is an axiomatic system such that 
1. Its formulas are formal sequents of L. 
2. A formal sequent r= d is a theorem iff r t-- A. 
The concept of a pure representation can naturally be extended to 
Gentzen-type representations as follows: 
DEFINITION. We call a rule of a Gentzen-type system pure if whenever 
it allows the inference of r,, 3 A, from rl + A,, . . . . r, * A, then there are 
subsets rl’, A: of r,, Aj (respectively) such that for every r:l, A;’ we can 
infer r;l, . . . . r;, r; -A;, A;‘, . . . . A,: from r;, r/ Z= A;, A(’ (i = 1, . . . . n). The 
systems as a whole is pure if all its rules are. 
The definitions of a pure N.D. rule and a Gentzen-type rule are similar. 
Hence the notation that is frequently used for the former can be generalized 
to the latter as 
(where the rl, A/ (0 < i 6 n) are as in the definition above). 
EXAMPLES. 1. the standard v-elimination rule of the intuitionistic 
(single-conclusioned) N.D. system, usually written as 
A ” B CA1 ca 
c c 
c ’ 
will have in Gentzen-type systems the form 
CA1 CBI 
c c 
CA v Bl 
c 
And in classical logic just the form (when @ is the empty set) 
CA1 L-B1 
0 0 
[A v B] ’ 
0 
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The introduction rule in this context will be just 
A, B 
AvB 




In classical logic, on the other hand, we can replace C above with the 
empty set. For both systems the succedent rule for conjunction is just 
A B 
A A B’ 
It is an interesting question (the discussion of which we leave to another 
opportunity) why people are used to writing the full sequents involved 
while doing proofs in Gentzen-type system, while more economical 
methods are used for N.D. systems. Repeating passive formulas again and 
again is after all what makes the use of Gentzen-systems tedious, especially 
if it is done by hand. Now the use of computerized systems should free us 
of this worry anyway, but it might still be desirable to develop methods 
to avoid such repetitions in the underlying representations. The above 
observation concerning representations of pure rules might then be helpful. 
Another promising recent contribution in this direction is Girard’s concept 
of proof-nets (see [Girard, 19871). The use of tableaux systems can also be 
regarded as a method of this kind. 
A major fact about Gentzen-type systems, even pure ones, is that unlike 
pure Hilbert-type and N.D. systems, the transitivity ( =cut) is never 
obvious. In the previous types of systems it was an easy consequence of the 
asymmetry between the roles of antecendents and succedents in their rules. 
In Gentzen-type systems this asymmetry is abolished, and so the cut-rule 
should either be taken as an explicit rule (as frequently it must) or else be 
proved admissible. This explains the fact that cut-elimination, which is 
crucial for every formal system, was (and is) investigated only in the 
context of Gentzen-type systems. 
“‘The form of this rule resembles that which some rules take in Schroeder-Heister’s 
calculus of higher-order rules. More on the connection between this calculus and Gentzen 
type calculi can be found in [Avron. 19901. 
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Usually, a Gentzen-type representation of a C.R. has the following form: 
It has as axioms the reflexivity axioms A *A (sometimes it suffices to take 
only a subset of these axioms and then derive the rest). The rules are then 
divided into two groups: 
l Structural rules, which operate on the multisets, but do not change 
the formulas in them (though they may add or delete some). Frequent 
examples are weakening, contraction, anticontraction, mingle (from 
Ti Z- A, and r, * dZ infer rl, r2 => d , , A,), and, of course, cut. 
l Rules concerning the constants of the language. Usually they are 
divided into succedent rules, which specify how a logical constant may be 
introduced in the succedent of a sequent, and antecedent rules, which do 
the same for the antecedent. 
In order to judge how good a given Gentzen-type presentation of a given 
CR. is, we should apply exactly the same criteria as we did for N.D. 
systems. However, since we allow more in Gentzen-type systems we are 
usually entitled to demand more. Hence we usually should expect it to be 
easier to demonstrate the validity of a formal sequent in a Gentzen-type 
formalism than it is in a corresponding N.D. system. Also we can expect 
nice proof-theoretic properties to hold. Such properties are usually proved 
by induction, the major step of which is showing that the various rules 
preserve the property under discussion. Usually the cut rule is the major 
obstacle to such a proof. A good example for this is the important sub- 
formula property. This property is preserved by all the rules we found as 
characteristic for the various internal and combining connectives. It is 
preserved also by all the structural rules considered in the last section- 
except cut. Hence if we delete cut from the set of rules of each of the 
systems we discuss in the last section we get formal systems with the 
subformula property. The cut-elimination theorem (which obtains for each 
of those systems) mean that these new systems are still representations of 
C.R.s and that the C.R.s they represent are identical to the original ones. 
5.5. Three Degrees of Impurity 
In the previous subsections a great deal of importance was attached to 
what we call pure systems. Our purpose in this one is to try to identify the 
most usual forms that irtlpuritr may take. We assume, accordingly, that we 
are dealing with a formal system of one of the types described above. 
Moreover, we assume that the inference rules leading from sequents to 
sequents are given by some global rule-schemes of the form described after 
the definition of a pure Gentzen-type system, but that there are side condi- 
tions on the applicability of some of these schemes which make them 
impure. We shall examine three possible ways in which this might happen: 
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Level 1: At this level the side conditions are related to the structure 
of the multisets of the side-formulas (r;, d(’ above). Examples of such side 
conditions are: 
l Demanding that there be no side formulas. In Hilbert-type 
systems rules with this condition are usually known as rules ofproof The 
best known example is the necessitation rule in traditional formulations of 
normal modal logics. Another example is the adjunction rule of many 
relevance logics (from A and B infer A A B) which frequently is taken to 
be only a rule of proof. 
l Demanding, in a multiple-conclusioned C.R., the succedents of 
the conclusion and the hypotheses of a rule to be singletons. Examples are 
the rule for the 0 in the Gentzen-type system for the minimal normal 
modal logic K (see above) and the succedent rule for the intuitionistic 
implication in the multiple-concclusioned Gentzen-type version which we 
mention in Section 4.4. 
l Demanding all the hypotheses of a rule to have exactly the same 
side-formulas. Examples are provided by the rules for the combining con- 
nectives in Section 4.3. For logics without contraction or weakening these 
rules are impure (and this explains why Girard [ 19871 has found the “mul- 
tiplicative” fragment of his logic, which is pure, to be better understood 
than the “additive” one, which is not). 
LeveZ2: Here the applicability of a rule might depend also on the 
structure of the side-formulas. Examples are: 
l The introduction rule for the 0 in the Prawitz N.D. system for 
S4. This rule permits the inference of l-+ CIA from r* A only if all the 
formulas in f begin with 0. 
l The introduction rule for V in the N.D. systems for classical and 
intuitionistic logics. Here one can infer r = VxA from r * A only if x does 
not occur free in lY (This is not the whole story, though, since this rule 
might become pure in the context of non-simple C.R.s. There are in fact no 
problems in dealing with this kind of impurity in the Edinburgh LF!) 
Level 3: Here an applicability of a rule might depend not only on its 
potential premises, but also on their proofs. A possible example may be 
provided by an attempt to base a N.D. system on the following version of 
the deduction theorem in classical first-order logic:” r t- A + B iff there is 
a proof of B from r, A in which no inference of VxC from C is made in 
which C depends on A and x is free in A. 
” See, e.g., in [Mendelson, 19641. This theorem is true for the pure Hilbert type system for 
ualidit.v which is presented there. 
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The third level of impurity carries us, in fact, beyond the class of uniform 
systems with which we were dealing so far. The main properties of uniform 
systems are that they treat exactly one C.R., and that once a sequent was 
derived in them one can completely forget about how it was derived while 
using it for deriving other sequents. For systems of the third level of 
impurity this is no longer the case. For each single step in them it might 
not be enough to find out, once and for all, whether it is valid or not. It 
might also be ncessary either to return to it later for other tests or to 
record in advance what side conditions that might be important elsewhere 
it violates. Such systems might therefore be inefficient in the time and space 
required for proof checking. Moreover, they might create difficult problems 
for general systems which are designed for implementing a large class of 
different logics (like the Edinburgh LF). It is advisable, therefore, to try to 
avoid the use of such systems. In the next section we shall suggest some 
possible methods for doing this when uniform representations are not 
available or the available ones are inefficient. 
6. NON-UNIFORM REPRESENTATIONS 
As we have seen in the previous section, all the standard proof systems 
are examples of uniform representations of consequence relations. 
However, if we accept that a formal system is essentially a device for 
deriving correct sequents (of a C.R. in which we happen to be interested) 
then there is no reason to limit ourselves to uniform formal systems. I 
believe that this observation might open the door to a new area of 
investigations with a wealth of promising possibilities. To demonstrate the 
potential of non-uniform representations we shall describe now two 
methods of developing such representations together with examples of their 
applicability. We hope that other efficient methods will be developed in the 
future. 
6.1. Treating Several Consequence Relations Simultaneously 
A major feature of uniform representations is that they treat only a single 
C.R. In mathematics it is often much more efficient to simultaneously solve 
several related problems. The problems of representing related consequence 
relations should not be an exception in this respect. A good example for 
this is provided by the two C.R.s which we have associated with modal 
logics in 3.3. Obviously, there are strong connections between them. On the 
other hand it is difficult to provide a nice pure representation of either, 
since each lacks some important properties (which the other has). It is 
reasonable, therefore, to try to represent them together in one formal 
system. This really can be done (at least for natural modal systems like 
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S4, T, K4 and so on). Examples of rules of the resulting system in the case 
of S4 are: 
In this system t-, is taken as multiple conclusioned while FL, as single con- 
clusioned. All the impurities of the usual representations are eliminated in 
the combined one (or-dependending on the meaning of “pure” in this 
context-are reduced to impurities of the first degree-see 5.5). It is worth 
noting that suitable variations of this system have actually been used in 
order to efficiently internalize modal logics in the Edinburgh LF system. 
More information concerning the problems involved in doing that and how 
this method helps to solve them in a natural way are described in [Avron, 
Honsell, and Mason, 19871. 
In [Avron, 19881 there is another example of a logic with which two 
principal consequence relations are naturally associated: Girard’s linear 
logic. One of these relations is the nonmonotonic linear C.R. which was 
described in Section 4.4 (and is induced by the standard Gentzen-type for- 
mulation of the logic). The other is the ordinary CR. which corresponds to 
its “phase” semantics (see [Girard, 19871). Although the first is the more 
basic one, it is the second which is easy to internalize in the LF in its 
present stage of development. The first can then be handled indirectly, via 
a translation into the second. 
6.2. Higher-Order Sequents 
Uniform representations are axiomatic systems in which the wff’s are 
formal sequents. Past experience shows that it has frequently been useful to 
extend such a system to a multiple-conclusioned one even if the ultimate 
interest remained in proving theoremhood of wffs. It is natural therefore to 
try applying the same process in the present case. This leads us to consider 
“hypersequents” which are sequents of sequents. Can they be useful? The 
answer is “yes”. The use of hypersequents allow us, for example, to develop 
cut-free Gentzen-type formulations for tLuk and t--sob, the two non- 
ordinary C.R.s which were described in Section 3.3. (See [Avron, to 
appear, a] for details.) Another example of this type is provided by the 
logic LC of Dummet. The corresponding hypersequential calculus can be 
found in [Avron, to appear, b]. Some other examples may also be found 
there. 32 
It is reasonable, of course, to go further and consider more iterations of 
“Cut-free hypersequential calculi were first introduced in [Pottinger. 19831 and, 
independently, in [Avron, 19871. 
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the above procedure. The interested reader is referred to [Schroeder- 
Heister, 1984; DoSen, 1985; Avron, 19903 for examples of cases in which 
this is done. Indeed, in those papers sequents of arbitrary degree of nesting 
are fruitfully employed! 
7. CONCLUSION 
The work above contains a rather general analysis of logics, formal 
systems and the relations between them. Still, much work remains to be 
done. Here is a list of future tasks (some of which were already mentioned 
above): 
l A satisfactory treatment of the subjects of quantification theory, 
variables, and substitutions. 
l Generalizing the framework to cope with effective C.R. between 
possibly infinite (multi)sets. 
l Identifying important sources of impurities of rules and systems on 
the one hand and developing general methods for handling them on the 
other. For example, the use of two consequence relations in the case of 
modal logics has an obvious semantical interpretation. Still, the success of 
the method of introducing an extra CR. does not seem to depend on this 
fact. It is rather general, and works, e.g., whenever the impurities are all 
due to the use of rules of proof (and in many other cases as well). 
l Using all these ideas to construct a much more general Logical 
Framework for implementing logics than the present Edingurgh LF is. 
Besides its practical importance the existence of such a system might enable 
us (among other things) to uniformly investigate universal problems which 
are connected with logical systems; e.g., their associated search space. 
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